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Exploring the impact of ownership structure on earnings 
predictability: Insights from Japan 
 
Abstract 
Using a very recent data over the period from 2007 to 2012 (sample period 2001-2012), this 
study estimates the relationship between ownership structure and earnings predictability in 
Japanese listed companies. In particular, this study investigates how three important categories 
of ownership (i.e. domestic institutional, foreign, and insider ownership) associated with 
earnings predictability in Japanese listed firms. The results show that higher domestic 
institutional (financial) ownership is associated with greater earnings predictability. The 
findings support the argument that institutional shareholders especially financial institutions 
ensure effective monitoring over corporate reporting practices which lead to better earnings 
quality.  In sharp contrast, this study finds that incremental foreign institutional ownership in 
Japanese listed firms is associated with lower earnings predictability. Such finding is contrary to 
the oversimplifying assumption that increasing cross-border shareholdings always associated 
with better earnings quality. This study demonstrates interesting insights regarding the impact of 
ownership structure on earnings predictability which surely carry significance for Japanese 
corporate policy makers and future researchers.  
Keywords: Earnings Predictability, Foreign Ownership, Insider Ownership, Institutional 




The main purpose of corporate financial reporting is to provide information to shareholders and 
other stakeholders for appropriate decisions making. As owners of the business, shareholders 
always have the top-most priority to demand information with better quality. Earnings 
information is the core item in the corporate financial statements, and therefore, quality of 
reported earnings is the issue of great interest to shareholders. However, due to the variations in 
the incentives and abilities of different types of shareholders to monitor corporate reporting 
behavior, the degree of earnings quality is expected to vary among the listed firms. For that 
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reason, exploring the impact of such variations on reported earnings quality has long been an 
issue of great interest to the empirical researchers. As an attempt to add further insight to this end, 
this study investigates the impact of corporate ownership structure on earnings predictability in 
the Japanese context. 
According to conceptual framework of accounting, earnings information is considered to be of 
high quality if it is faithfully represented and relevant for decision making. Earnings information 
is considered to be faithfully represented if earnings number and description match with what 
really existed or happened. On the other hand, Earnings information is considered to be relevant 
if it has the capacity to influence the future decisions of the users. Earnings predictability is one 
of the core elements of earnings relevance. Predictability refers to the extent to which current 
earnings help the investors to predict the future earnings and/or future cash flows of a firm. 
Earnings numbers are viewed as high quality when they enable investors to better estimate a 
firm's future prospects (Valury and Jenkin, 2006; Dichev et al., 2013). Affleck-Graves et al. 
(2002) contend that low earnings predictability increases information asymmetry in the market. 
They find that firms with relatively less predictable earnings have a higher cost of equity capital 
than comparable firms with more predictable earning streams, ceteris paribus. Based on a survey 
study of more than 400 chief financial officers (CFOs), Graham et al. (2005) find that top 
managers tend to believe that less predictable earnings command a risk premium in the capital 
markets Moreover, a lack of correspondence between current and future earnings can also 
provide a helpful indication of earnings management practice.  Francis et al. (2004) also argue 
that predictability is an essential attribute of earnings from the perspectives of standard setters 
and analysts. Therefore, in this study, earnings predictability is used as a proxy of earnings 
quality.  This study is unique in the sense that no other study in Japan investigates how variation 
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in ownership structure affects predictability of reported earnings. In particular, this study 
investigates how three important categories of ownership (i.e. domestic institutional, foreign 
institutional, and insider1 ownership) associated with earnings predictability in Japanese listed 
firms. 
The results show that higher domestic institutional (financial) ownership is associated with better 
earnings predictability. This finding supports the argument that institutional shareholders 
especially financial institutions have the incentives as well as ability to ensure effective 
monitoring over corporate reporting practices which lead to better earnings predictability.  In 
sharp contrast, this study finds that incremental foreign institutional ownership in Japanese listed 
firms is associated with poorer earnings predictability. The findings are contrary to the 
oversimplifying assumption that increasing cross-border shareholdings always associated with 
better reporting quality. However, such finding is in harmony with 'transient investment 
hypothesis' and/or 'information asymmetry hypothesis' which state that due to short investment 
horizon and/or deficiency of information due to physical distance, foreign investors lack 
necessary incentives and control to ensure the effective monitoring over corporate earnings 
quality.   This study also finds that though the ownership by domestic business corporations 
(non-financial) is almost as large as ownership by domestic financial institutions, but it has no 
significant relationship with earnings predictability. In addition, the study fails to find any 
significant relationship between insider ownership and earnings predictability. 
The findings of this study are expected to be helpful for the Japanese corporate regulators/policy 
makers to understand the roles played by different groups of investor on corporate reporting 
behavior and guide them to formulate policy regarding corporate ownership structure. For 
                                                          
1 In this study, insider ownership refers to the shareholdings by directors who are also the top-executives in the company. 
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investors and creditors, the findings would help them to assess the predictability of reported 
earnings number based on the ownership structure of the listed firms.  This study also expands 
the research corpus of earnings quality and its’ determinants by providing evidence from a 
country which represents the third largest economy as well as capital market in the world. 
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the available literature and develops the 
necessary hypothesis for this study. Section 3 provides details of sample and research design, 
while section 4 reports the main results. Finally, section 5 summarizes and concludes this study. 
 
2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
From a corporate governance viewpoint, governance and control are the most important 
determinant of earnings quality (Ebihara et al., 2012). Effective monitoring and control limit 
both managerial discretion and errors in earnings’ reporting (Doyle et al., 2007; Klein, 2002), 
and ensure that reported earnings to be more informative about firms’ current and future 
corporate performance.  As a mechanism of corporate governance and control, corporate 
ownership structure is anticipated to be an important determinant of earnings quality. Fan and 
Wong (2002) mention, “just as the share ownership structure delineates a firm's agency problem, 
it also impacts the firm's reporting” (p. 408). Cohen et al. (2004) identify ownership structure as 
external governance mechanism which affects financial reporting quality. Wang (2006) argue 
that ownership structures affect both the demand and supply of quality financial reporting in the 
listed firms. Ben-Nasr et al. (2009) state that ownership structure could explain cross-firms 
differences in the quality of accounting information. Corporate ownership in Japan has 
historically been dominated by the domestic institutional investors. On an average, a fifty percent 
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share in the Japanese companies is still owned by domestic institutions. Two major groups of 
domestic institutional investors are financial institutions (i.e. city & regional banks, trust banks, 
insurance companies and other financial institutions) and other business corporations (i.e. parent 
and associate companies, business partner companies and others).  After the financial crisis in the 
1990s and subsequent reforms2, the ownership by financial institutions has reduced to great 
extent. Indeed, the average proportion of market stock held by financial institutional investors 
has declined from 45.2 percent in 1990 to 23.8 percent in 2012 (TSE, 2012). On the other hand, 
the average ownership by other domestic business corporations has changed very little from 25.2 
percent to 23.3 percent (TSE, 2012). In addition, after the financial crisis in the 1990s, cross-
border investors are increasingly occupying the greater percentage of ownership in Japanese 
listed companies. Indeed, the average proportion of market stock held by foreign investors 
increased from 4.2 percent in 1990 to 24.3 percent in 2012 (TSE, 2012). At present, the 
magnitude of ownership by foreign investors in Japanese companies is highest among the listed 
firms in Asian countries. Majority of the foreign ownership are institutional in nature which 
mostly includes mutual funds and pension funds (Cheung et al., 1999). On the other hand, while 
the insider ownership in Japanese companies is very low, but such ownership is expected to have 
significant role over corporate reporting behaviors due to insider-oriented corporate boards and 
life-time employment system.  The following discussion deals with prior studies that have 
provided arguments as well as evidence about the roles played by different types of ownership 
on the corporate earnings quality.  Based on the discussion, necessary hypotheses will be 
formulated in this study. 
                                                          
2 In particular, Anti-Monopoly Act 1977 being effective from 1987 (Ferris & Park, 2005), BIS regulations and 
Banks’ Shareholdings Restriction Act 2001 (Miyajima & Kuroki, 2006) and the changing of accounting standard 




2.1 Institutional Ownership and Earnings Quality 
The conflict of interests between shareholders and managers in the listed firms gives rise to 
agency costs which become more intense in the presence of diffused individual shareholdings.3 
The presence of institutional investors, with their larger ownership can influence such conflicts 
by the level of their involvement and monitoring (Shleifer & Vishney, 1986). Institutional 
investors as external governance mechanism could supplement the oversight function of internal 
governance mechanisms (i.e. board monitoring, audit).  Qi et al. (2000) state that ownership by 
legal persons (institutions or corporate investors) entails even better monitoring than state. 
Institutional investors have the incentives, expertise, ability and power to discipline managerial 
and corporate behaviors.  Claessen and Fan (2002) suggest that the involvement of institutional 
investors’ equity participation may improve corporate governance practices in Asian firms. They 
can provide active monitoring that is difficult for smaller, more passive or less-informed 
investors (Almazan et al., 2005). This is called ‘efficient monitoring hypothesis’. Empirical 
researchers have explored this hypothesis to examine the relationship between institutional 
ownership and various corporate aspects. 
  
Following ‘efficient monitoring hypothesis’, expectation can logically be formed that 
institutional investors would equally play significant role for upholding and enhancing corporate 
reporting behavior, and thus, earnings quality. Institutional owners are also efficient and skilled 
in monitoring the corporate reporting behavior of managers which discipline the managers to 
report earnings with better quality. As sophisticated investors, they are more adept at 
                                                          
3 Dispersed or wider individual shareholdings do not provide sufficient incentives for shareholders to monitor 
corporate aspects due to large monitoring costs and free-riders problem. Warfield et al. (1995) mention that 
shareholders of corporations with diffuse ownership structures lack the resources, incentives, and access relevant 
information to monitor managerial activities. In addition, disperse shareholdings allow the managers to do more 
opportunistic activities at the costs of the shareholders’ welfare. 
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accumulating and evaluating public information than individual investors. They are expected to 
have the ability to trace any sort of discrepancies between the reported earnings and underlying 
performance. Balsam et al. (2002) state that institutional investors as sophisticated investors are 
capable of detecting earnings management more quickly and easily than non-institutional 
investors. Koh (2003) asserts that institutional investors can act as a complementary corporate 
governance mechanism in mitigating myopic aggressive earnings management when they have a 
sufficiently high ownership level.  Roychowdhury (2006) also asserts that institutional investors 
have a greater ability to analyze the long-term implications of current managerial actions which 
would act as a disincentive for managers to engage in real earnings manipulation. Moreover, due 
to large monetary value tied to these large shareholdings, institutional investors is expected to be 
more powerful, and choose to be more informed about firms’ profitability than other investors 
with small shareholding.  
Institutional investors also have other incentives for monitoring earnings quality. First, reported 
earnings with high quality are greatly reflected in the market price/return of shares.  
Alternatively speaking, lower level of earnings quality is associated with severe market 
repercussions. Balsam et al. (2002) analyze stock returns over a short window following the 
release of quarterly financial statements by companies for which there is ex post evidence of 
earnings management. They report a negative association between unexpected discretionary 
accruals and cumulative abnormal returns over a 17-day window. Second, reported earnings with 
high quality are associated with lower information risk, and thus, reduce costs of firm debts. 
Sengupta (1998) documents that higher level of disclosure quality is associated with lower costs 
of debt. The issue would be of great interest to institutional shareholders with large investments 
because higher costs of debts reduce the net financial benefits or wealth of the residual claimants 
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(i.e. shareholders).  Third, unlike individual investors, institutional investors have greater 
accountability to their own shareholders which compel them to more actively manage for their 
investments in listed firms. When institutional investors have relatively large number of shares in 
a company, they cannot easily convert their investments into cash if the company faces any 
reporting failure, and therefore, they have more incentive to monitor reporting quality. Finally, 
institutional investors are more concerned about reputation which encourages them to constrain 
any reporting failure including poor earnings quality. Apart from monitoring and controlling the 
reporting behaviors of the managers, institutional investors often are able to share their reporting 
know-how which assists and guides the managers reporting earnings information with highest 
quality. 
However, the alternative possibility is that institutional investors do not play an active role in 
monitoring quality of reported earnings. Dechow and Schrand (2004) argue that growth of 
institutional investors with no interest in firm’s business is one of the major causes that decline 
earnings quality. Alves (2012) states that institutional investors may be incapable of exerting 
their monitoring role over managers because it may affect their business relationships with the 
firm.  This is also called as ‘strategic alliance hypothesis’. Further possibility is that institutional 
investors as controlling investors may collude with management to take the advantage of insider 
information and indoor trading (Pound 1988). Sundaramurthy et al. (2005) state that institutional 
investors might be passive, collusive or myopic. As they have access to inside information of the 
company, they would be more inclined to mask the true performance of the company and reduce 
the quality of reported earnings to maximize their own benefit at the costs of minority or non-
institutional shareholders. This is often called as ‘private benefit of control hypothesis’ (Velury 
& Jenkin, 2006).  
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Rajgopal et al. (1999) find that the absolute value of discretionary accruals is negatively related 
to the level of institutional ownership. This finding is consistent with managers recognizing that 
institutional owners are better informed than individual investors, which reduces the perceived 
benefit of managing accruals. Using discretionary accounting accruals as the measure of earnings 
management, Chung et al. (2002) find that the presence of large institutional shareholdings 
inhibit managers from increasing or decreasing reported profits towards the managers' desired 
level or range of profits. Jung and Kown (2002) investigate the relationship of ownership 
structure with earnings quality in Korea. Their findings indicate that earnings informativeness 
increases with the increasing holdings of institutional investors. Mitra and Cready (2005) find 
that aggregate institutional ownership is negatively related to managerial flexibility on the 
accrual process. Using data from the Standard & Poor’s 500 companies during the period 1994–
2002, Wang (2006) find positive relationship between institutional ownership and earnings 
quality i.e. lower absolute abnormal accruals and less persistence of transitory loss components. 
Using the US evidence over the period 1992-1999, Velury and Jenkins (2006) provide a 
comprehensive insight by examining the role of institutional ownership on the quality of reported 
earnings using the Financial Accounting Standards Board's (FASB) conceptual framework as a 
basis. They demonstrate significant evidence that higher level of institutional ownership is 
associated with higher earnings quality. Roychowdhury (2006) find that institutional investors 
constrain real earnings management in the firms in which they invest.4   Based on Chinese data, 
Dong-lin and Gang (2008) examine the relation between institutional ownership and three 
attributes of earnings: discretionary accrual, value relevance, and conservatism. They find that 
firms with institutional ownership have better earnings quality than firms without institutional 
                                                          





ownership. They suggest that fast development of institutional investors is beneficial for both the 
corporate governance system and the information environment in capital market. Using 
Malaysian evidence, Al-Dhamari and Ismail (2013) find that predictability of earnings is high 
when firms have high shareholdings by institutions. Based on Japanese evidence in the 1990s, 
Teshima and Shuto (2008) find that institutional ownership in Japanese context inhibits earnings 
management using discretionary accruals. Tokoro and Nagata (2012) also find that the 
probability of issuing optimistically biased managerial forecasts is lower for firms with greater 
percentage of institutional ownership. 
On the contrary, based on emerging market (Jordan) evidence, Al-Fayoumi et al. (2010) find that 
institutional ownership has no significant impact on managerial behavior of earnings 
management.   
From the discussion above, it appears that there is no general agreement regarding the effect of 
institutional ownership on earnings quality. Therefore, this study devises first hypothesis as 
following: 
H1: There is a significant relationship between institutional ownership and earnings quality 
(earnings predictability). 
According to the share-ownership survey-2012 conducted by Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE), on 
average, ownership by domestic institutions comprises about fifty percent of the listed equities of 
Japanese companies at market value. Domestic institutional shareholders are of two major types: 
financial institutional shareholders (city and regional banks, trust banks, insurance companies, 
and other financial institutions) and other business corporate shareholders. On average, each of 
these two categories of owners holds approximately one quarter of listed shares of Japanese 
companies (TSE, 2012). Okabe (2004) mentions that historically, financial institutions play a 
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significant role in the corporate governance system of Japan. According to the share-ownership 
survey-2012, banks own the lion portions of shares (around eighty percent) in the category of 
financial institutional ownership. Banking relationships in Japan are very long-term in nature and 
bank monitoring is often considered as the primary means of monitoring even for both large and 
small firms in Japan (Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2010). They usually have dual monitoring roles as 
investors as well as debt providers over corporate aspects including reporting behaviors.  In their 
study, Yoshikawa and Rasheed (2010) consider banks as pressure resistant institutional investors 
in Japan. Therefore, ownership by financial institutions which mostly comprises ownership by 
banks is supposed to have significant role over the quality of reported earnings in the Japanese 
companies. 
In contrast, the ownership category of ‘domestic business corporations’ usually includes parents 
and business partner firms of the listed companies (Miyajima & Kuroki, 2006; Yoshikawa & 
Rasheed, 2010). Tokoro and Nagata (2012) posit that ownership by non-financial companies in 
Japan reflects cross-shareholdings in Japanese context. Even though the term ‘cross-
shareholdings’ literary means mutual shareholdings among firms, but in Japanese context such 
phenomenon is also an indication of long-standing business relationships.  Due to the presence of 
reciprocal ownership as well as potential business relationships, this category of owners may 
have different incentives or reservation to monitor the earnings quality of investee listed firms. In 
Japanese context, Chung et al. (2004) mention that Japanese firms are typically cross-held by 
other business corporations. They find that value relevance of discretionary accruals is lower for 
cross-held firm. 5  In order to provide more insights, it is really essential to separately investigate 
the impact of financial as well as other business corporate ownerships on earnings predictability. 
                                                          
5 Using Korean evidence, Bae and Jeong (2007) find that cross-equity or reciprocal ownership negatively affects 
value-relevance of earnings.  
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Hence, the first hypothesis is decomposed into following two hypotheses:   
H1a: There is a significant relationship between domestic financial institutional ownership 
and earnings quality (earnings predictability). 
H1b: There is a significant relationship between domestic business corporate ownership and 
earnings quality (earnings predictability). 
2.2 Foreign Ownership and Earnings Quality 
Although the domestic institutions are still the most important shareholders of Japanese firms, 
the fraction of foreign ownership in Japanese firms has significantly increased over the last two 
decades. Indeed, the proportion of stock held by foreign investors increased from 4.2 percent in 
1990 to 24.3 percent in 2012 (TSE, 2012). Majority of those foreign investors are institutional in 
nature (Cheung et al., 1999; Haider et al., 2013; Hiraki et al., 2003), which typically include 
mutual funds and pension funds. In a study of RIETI (The Research Institute of Economy, Trade 
and Industry), Naoki (2009) mentions: 
“Since the 1990s, cross-shareholding for maintaining stable shares has been dissolved 
and ownership by institutional investors, especially, ownership by foreign institutional 
investors continued to rise, and they have taken a lead in exercising their rights as 
investors to monitor corporate management”(p. 5). 
 
Unlike many Asian countries (e.g. China, Philippine, South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, 
Thailand), no binding constraints on foreign equity ownership in Japan (Jiang & Kim, 2004, 
Liang et al., 2012).6 Stulz (1999) shows that the openness of domestic capital markets to foreign 
                                                          
6 Except domestic air carriers and broadcasting companies where voting rights to foreign investors restricted to 1/3 




investors is associated with a higher demand for good corporate governance and higher corporate 
transparency. Ahmadjian (2004) asserts that foreign institutional investment associated with 
changing corporate governance practices.  Thus, exploring the relation between foreign 
ownership (in particular, foreign institutional ownership) and earnings quality in Japan are 
important to demonstrate the significance of their monitoring effect on corporate governance.  
There are two alternative hypotheses that could explain the role of foreign institutional 
shareholdings on earnings quality. The first one is called ‘outsider expertise hypothesis’. 
According to this hypothesis, foreign investors have the expertise and tendency to improve the 
corporate governance and disclosure standards of business firms to international level. Frydman 
et al. (1999) argue that foreign owners have the financial resources, managerial know-how, and 
corporate governance expertise that give them an advantage over other owners in monitoring 
corporate aspects. As foreign institutional shareholders do not usually have any sort of business 
ties with the firms, it is likely that they have the incentives to independently monitor the 
corporate reporting behaviors including reporting quality. 7  Firth et al. (2007) argue that the 
foreign investors will put pressure on companies to continue to improve the quality of their 
accounting information.  According to An (2009), “external monitoring by foreign investors as 
large institutional investors can constrain the opportunities for discretionary choices of 
management in providing financial accounting information, thereby increasing earnings quality” 
(p. 77). Foreign investors use reported earnings to evaluate the performance of their investments 
more often and frequently than domestic investors due to geographical distance. So, there is a 
strong incentive from the side of the foreign investors to seek for higher earnings quality. Using 
                                                          
7 Foreign investors in Japan are less tied to system of cross-shareholding as well as reciprocal obligations or favors 
(Ahmadjian, 2004), which allow their incremental monitoring role over corporate reporting behaviors. Moreover, 
foreign institutional shareholders have limited or no opportunity of private benefit extraction due to physical, 
cultural, legal, and institutional differences. 
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Korean evidence, Bae and Jeong (2007) find that foreign equity ownership  positively associated 
with value-relevance of earnings. An (2009) also finds that foreign ownership in Korean listed 
firms increases earnings quality (persistence and value relevance).  Using a unique dataset of 174 
privatized firms from 29 countries between 1980 and 2003, Ben-Nasr et al. (2009) find that 
foreign ownership is associated with less persistence of negative earnings changes i.e. greater 
conservatism.   
In sharp contrast, it also can be argued that foreign institutional owners usually invest for short-
horizon, and they lack adequate incentive to monitor the earnings quality of listed firms. This 
alternative view is called ‘transient investment hypothesis’. Hsu and Koh (2005) find that firms 
with greater transient institutional investors are associated with upward accruals management. 
Liu and Peng (2008) find that firms with higher transient institutional ownership have lower 
accruals quality. Jiang and Anandarajan (2009) find that when firms' stocks are held 
predominantly by institutions with short investment horizons, the role of shareholder rights in 
constraining aggressive and opportunistic management of earnings is significantly diminished or 
rendered essentially ineffective. Unlike domestic institutional investors, foreign investors in 
Japan which mainly include mutual funds and pensions funds trade their shares very frequently.8 
Yoshikawa and Rasheed (2010) mention that foreign investors in Japan may seek financial 
returns rather than strategic interests. . This tendency of foreign investors may tempt managers to 
manage earnings myopically which lead to poor earnings quality.  Liu and Peng (2008) treat 
institutional investors with high portfolio turnover as transient and find that such category of 
institutional ownership is negatively associated with accruals quality 
                                                          
8 According to a study conducted by TSE, in the year 2011, the trading of foreign investors comprises 54 percent of 
total trading value (683 trillion Japanese yen, approximately), whereas the trading value by domestic institutional 





In addition, a corroborative argument is that even though foreign investors are holding 
significant ownership in the listed firms of Japan but they are not active in exercising their right 
over the firms’ governance aspects due to lack of physical and cultural proximity.9 Lack of 
proximity also reduces monitoring effectiveness. Moreover, foreign investors in Japan may be 
disadvantaged in gaining access to private or exclusively shared information about a firm’s 
current and future prospects (Cheung et al., 1999; Kang & Kim, 2010).10 Domestic institutions 
usually have greater advantages (e.g., sharing the same culture and language) than foreign 
institutions which is called home court advantage. Ayers et al. (2011) mention that domestic 
institutions also enjoy lower information acquisition costs because they can more easily arrange 
face-to-face meetings with local executives and are more readily exposed to local media, which 
tends to provide greater coverage of local firms.  Unfamiliarity of foreign investors with 
domestic environment and consequent monitoring failure could provide  managers both 
incentives and discretions to report earnings far different from underlying economic performance. 
This tendency can be simply termed as ‘information asymmetry hypothesis’.   Based on 
evidence from 37 non-U.S. countries from 2000 to 2009, Kim et al. (2013) find that   domestic 
institutional investors are more effective than foreign institutional investors at constraining 
earnings management. Using Japanese evidence over the period from 1999 to 2004, Mitani 
(2010) finds that higher level of foreign institutional ownership in Japanese firms is associated 
with higher earnings management. 
                                                          
9 In an interview conducted by Global Custodian in 2004, Yoshiaki Tamura (Senior Vice President, Information 
Products TSE) who was then officially responsible for the proxy voting platform mentions, “as per some estimates, 
the foreign investors’ votes count approximately 25 percent of the stocks held by them. On the other hand, almost 
100 percent of shares held by Japanese banks and 95 percent held by investment trusts and insurance companies 
already are being voted” (p. 1). For details please visit the following link:  
http://www.tse.or.jp/english/listing/meeting/b7gje60000003wvq-att/gc.pdf 
10  Jiang and Kim (2004) also mention that, due to Japanese institutional environment, foreign investors are 
disadvantaged in gaining access to private information about a firm’s future prospects and/or business strategies. 
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From the discussion above, it appears that there is no general agreement regarding the effect of 
foreign ownership on earnings quality. Therefore, the hypothesis is devised as following: 
H2: There is a significant relationship between foreign ownership and earnings quality 
(earnings predictability). 
 
2.3 Insider Ownership and Earnings Quality 
In Japanese context, insider ownership simply means the ownership right of the corporate 
directors or managers in the listed firms.11 There are two alternative explanations available in the 
existing literature that could explain the role of insider ownership on earnings quality. The first 
one is called ‘interest alignment hypothesis’. According to this hypothesis, more managerial 
stake in the ownership of firms aligns the interest of the managers and that of shareholders. 
Managers with marginal or no equity stake have the tendency to manage earnings for masking 
the true economic performance to increase their performance related compensation, to seek 
protection against dismissal when underperforming, and to fulfill other personal motives (e.g., 
Healy, 1985; Healy & Wahlen, 1999; Shuto, 2007; Yang et al., 2008). However, as capital 
bonding increases, the incentive of managers to act in the interest of shareholders also increases. 
This incentive-alignment leads managers to adopt accounting policies, disclosure standards and 
estimation techniques that reflect the underlying economic performance of the firm. Moreover, 
due to ownership stake, managerial interests also become tagged with the value of the share, and 
managers become increasingly interested to report better quality earnings that have long term 
implications on market price. Warfield et al. (1995) argue that because of greater personal 
investment and relatively less influence from capital markets, highly invested managers are more 
                                                          
11  In Japanese unique style of governance, corporate boards are occupied by the internally promoted directors who 
are also the managers of the firms. Therefore, following prior studies (Shuto, 2007; Shuto & Takada, 2010; Teshima 
& Shuto, 2008), the terms ‘managers’ and ‘directors’ have been used interchangeably throughout this study. 
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likely to make accounting choices that reflect firm economics rather than personal motives. 
Using data from the US firms, they find that managerial ownership is positively associated with 
earnings informativeness and negatively associated with magnitude of discretionary accruals. 
 
A competing view is the ‘managerial entrenchment hypothesis’, which is based on the 
argument that greater managerial ownership increases the discretionary power of the manager 
which is ultimately used to expropriate wealth from other shareholders. It is often called moral 
hazard phenomenon. Greater ownership in firms allows managers feel less pressured from 
capital market and allow them to reduce the transparency of earnings information without being 
disciplined by outside shareholders (Sanchez-Ballesta & Garcia-Meca, 2007). When managers 
own relatively large shares in the company, their control over the operation as well as 
governance of the firms substantially increases, which induces them to impair the faithful 
determination of earnings number. Moreover, managerial ownership limits accounting 
information flows to outside investors, and creates information asymmetry (Pergola et al., 2009). 
Information asymmetry allows managers to lower the transparency and informativeness of 
earnings in order to maximize their own interests or not to signal their private information. Fan 
and Wong (2002) examine the ownership structure of 977 companies in seven East Asian 
countries (Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand). 
They find that managers who had controlling interests report accounting information for self-
interested purposes causing reported earnings to lose credibility to outside investors.  Using data 
from Denmark, Gabrielsen et al. (2002) find that as managerial ownership increases, the 
informativeness of earnings declines. Cheng and Warfield (2005) focus on the relation between 
managerial equity incentives and signed abnormal accruals, and find that managers with high 
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equity incentive are more likely to involve with earnings management. Cohen et al. (2008) also 
find that discretionary accruals are positively related to managerial equity incentives in the pre- 
and post Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 periods for US firms. Interestingly, Francis et al. (1999) and 
Rajgopal et al. (1999) find no evidence that managerial share ownership has a significant impact 
on income-increasing or decreasing accruals of US firms.  In Japanese firms, the ownership by 
managers is not very large. 12  However, as corporate boards of Japanese firms are mainly 
dominated by the insiders and there is a provision of life-time employment, this small fraction of 
ownership could play significant role over corporate governance and reporting practices either 
favorably or unfavorably. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that ownership by corporate 
insiders would have significant impact on earnings quality of Japanese firms. Darrough et al. 
(1998) investigate the relationship between managerial ownership and discretionary accruals in 
Japanese context, and find a significant positive relationship in 1989 but no significant 
relationship in subsequent three years.  
Based on the discussion in this part, this study formulates the following hypothesis in non-
directional way: 
 
H3: There is a significant relationship between insider ownership and earnings quality 
(earnings predictability). 
3.0 SAMPLE AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.1 Sample Description  
The sample of Japanese firms is selected from the period 2001 to 2012 (estimation period from 
2007 to 2012) based on the following criteria: 
                                                          
12  Jiang and Kim (2004) mention that management ownership (i.e. inside holding) is not significant in Japan and 
stock options plans are very rare. 
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(i) Firms are listed on Japanese stock markets  
(ii) Financial companies including banks, securities, and insurance firms are excluded. 
(iii) The accounting period of the firms is unchanged during the period 2001 to 2012. 
(iv) The necessary data for the study are available in Nikkei-NEEDS database. 
(v) Industry sectors having less than 10 firms are also excluded.  
(vi) No data required for this study is missing during the sample period. 
The selection process yields 7,248 firm-year observations as estimation sample size and 14,496 
firm-year observations as total sample size for 1,208 non-financial firms publicly traded in 
Japanese stock exchanges. Table 1 details the breakdown of observations across different 
industry-sectors. 




3.2 Empirical Model Specification 
In order to empirically examine the relationship between foreign ownership and earnings 
predictability (EP), the following regression model is formulated: 
EP , =  α + β Fin_Share , + β Corp_Share , + β For_Share , +
β Insider_Share , + θ Size , + θ Lev , + θ Profitability , + θ Growth , +
θ Loss_Dummy , + ∑ δ Industry + ∑ φ Year + ε , -----------(1) 
The subscript j denotes each firm and subscript t denotes each year. The next section provides 
necessary description of the variables incorporated in the above regression model. 
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3.3 Variables Measurement and Description 
3.3.1Earnings Predictability (EP) 
Earnings predictability is one of the core elements of earnings’ relevance as suggested by the 
FASB and IASB joint conceptual framework. Lipe (1990) define predictability specifically as 
"the ability of past earnings to predict future earnings”. If earnings predictability is high, then 
current earnings information is more informative for predicting future earnings. Chaney et al. 
(2011) argue that users of accounting information are generally interested in assessing current 
performance as well as estimating future performance. Therefore, earnings that produce better 
predictions of future performance are treated as being higher quality.  
Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001) find that earnings predictability is an essential component of firm 
valuation. Affleck-Graves et al. (2002) contend that low earnings predictability increases 
information asymmetry in the market. They find that firms with relatively less predictable 
earnings have a higher cost of equity capital than comparable firms with more predictable 
earning streams, ceteris paribus.  Francis et al. (2004) also argue that predictability is an essential 
attribute of earnings from the perspectives of standard setters and analysts.  Based on a survey 
study of more than 400 chief financial officers (CFOs), Graham et al. (2005) find that top 
managers tend to believe that less predictable earnings command a risk premium in the capital 
markets.  Crabtree and Maher (2005) examine the extent to which earnings predictability plays a 
role in establishing a firm’s cost of debt capital, and find that predictable earnings have positive 
and direct debt market benefits that manifest firm in the form of higher bond ratings and a lower 
cost of debt capital. Prior literature also demonstrates that earnings predictability can affect the 
market response to an earnings release and analyst forecasts accuracy (Imhoff & Lobo, 1992; 
Pincus ,1983). Earnings that produce better predictions of future earnings would be preferred by 
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the investors. Therefore, in this study, the predictability of earnings is considered as the proxy of 
earnings quality. 
Lipe (1990) argues that volatility reduces predictability of earnings. Dichev and Tang (2009) 
mention that earnings volatility is a parsimonious statistic which summarizes a considerable 
amount of information about earnings predictability.  Following Lipe (1990), the predictability of 
earnings is measured by regressing current earnings on lagged earnings:  
 
EP = √[σ (ϑ , )] 
Where,  
X= earnings before extra-ordinary items scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year t. 
The above equation is estimated for each firm-year over rolling seven-year windows from t−6 to 
t. The estimated residuals (ϑ , ) reflect earnings shocks of firm j in the period t. Variance of 
earnings shocks 𝜎 (𝜗 , ) indicates the magnitude of future earnings unrelated to past earnings i.e., 
if 𝜎 (𝜗 , ))=0, then past earnings predict future earnings perfectly. The ability of past earnings to 
predict future earnings decreases (increases) as  𝜎 (𝜗 , ) increases (decreases). Like Francis et al. 
(2004), this study considers the square root of variance 𝑖. 𝑒. , √𝜎 (𝜗 , ) as a proxy of earnings 
predictability.  This study denotes this measure of earnings predictability as ‘EP’. Large (small) 
values of this measure imply less (more) predictable earnings, and thus, less (more) earnings 
quality.  
3.3.2 Ownership Structure Variables 
Xj,t =  φ0,j + φ1,jXj,t−1 +  ϑj,t  
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Considering the ownership structure of Japanese companies, this study focuses on four 
categories of ownership in Japanese listed firms. They are domestic financial institutional 
ownership, domestic corporate ownership, foreign ownership and insider ownership. Ownership 
by domestic financial institutions denoted as ‘Fin_Share’ (fraction of total shares owned by 
domestic banks, insurance and other financial companies), ownership by domestic companies 
denoted as ‘Corp_Share’ (fraction of total shares owned by domestic non-financial companies), 
and ownership by foreign institutional investors denoted as ‘For_Share’ (fraction of total shares 
owned by foreign institutions). In addition, ownership by directors is denoted as ‘Insider_share’ 
(fraction of total shares owned by directors).  
 
3.3.3 Other Control Variables 
This study also controls for several other factors that have been found as significant determinants 
of earnings quality in previous studies (Ben-Nasr et al., 2009; Jung & Kwon, 2002; Katz, 2009; 
Koh, 2003; Wang, 2006). These are firm’s size, leverage, growth, profitability and incidence of 
negative earnings or loss. ‘Size’ is defined as the natural logarithms of total assets, ‘Lev’ is 
defined as total debt divided by total assets at beginning of the year t, ‘Growth’ is defined as 
growth in sales for firm i at year t, ‘Profitability’ is defined as income before extra-ordinary 
items divided by total assets at beginning of the year t, and ‘Loss_dummy’ is defined as a dummy 





In addition, this study includes industry dummies and year dummies in regression model to 
control for the industry-specific and time-specific macro-economic conditions that might have 
some influence on quality of reported earnings.13 
4.0 RESULTS AND INTERPRETATIONS 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables considered in this study. Predictability 
measure (‘EP’) has a mean value of 0.024; as a benchmark, Boonlert-U-Thai et al. (2006) report 
mean value of 0.032 for their sample of 16,461 firm-year observations  of Japanese listed firms  
over 1994-2003.  
Regarding ownership structure variables, on average, ownership by domestic financial 
institutions (‘Fin_Share’) is about 25.5 percent and ownership by domestic business corporations 
(‘Corp_Share’) is about 27 percent, indicating the strong control of domestic institutional 
shareholders on Japanese companies. Ownership by foreign institutional shareholders 
(‘For_Share’) is around 11 percent, on average, which indicates relatively large stake by foreign 
institutions in Japanese firms.  The average of directors’ ownership (‘Insider_Share') is about 3.3 
percent of total shares of Japanese listed firms, which is less than the value (5.0 percent) 
suggested by Tehshima and Shuto (2008) based on the evidence of 1990s.  Regarding firm 
characteristic variables, firm size (‘Size’) is measured as the natural logarithm of firm’s total 
assets, and the mean value is 11.32. The average of leverage (‘Lev’) ratio is about 52 percent of 
                                                          
13 Following prior studies, this study prefers to use industry fixed effects rather than firm fixed effects. Zhou (2001) 
notes that a potential problem of inferences based on the firm fixed effects approach is that, when  ownership levels 
change very slowly across time, it  may mask a significant ownership effect. Pant and Pattanayak (2007) argue that 
using firm level fixed effects is problematic as it removes all cross-sectional variation which is important for 
governance study.  
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total assets at the beginning of fiscal year , which is less to the value (59 percent) reported by 
Shuto and Takada (2010) for their sample of 27,485 firm-year observations for the period 1991-
2005 . Nonetheless, this implies that the Japanese firms are yet largely dependent on debt 
financing. The average of growth ratio (‘Growth’), measure by sales growth, is around 1.1 
percent. The average of profitability (‘Profitability’) is about 4.8 percent. In comparison, using 
16,368 firm-year observations for the period 1991-2000, Shuto (2007) finds that the mean value 
of profitability of Japanese firms is about 1.9 percent. This indicates that Japanese firms are 
making better profit than what they have earned during the financial crisis in the 1990s. Further, 
the mean value of the variable Loss_Dummy which indicates incidence of reporting negative 
earnings or loss shows that approximately 9.3 percent of firm-year observations show negative 
profitability during the sample period of this study.  
                                             [INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
4.2 Correlation matrix and Multi-collinearity Check 
Table 3 reports the correlation matrix of the variables considered in this study. The correlation 
matrix shows negative significant relationship between financial institutional ownership 
(‘Fin_Share’) and earnings predictability measure which indicate that higher level of financial 
institutional ownership is associated with higher level of earnings predictability in Japanese firms. 
Ownership by domestic business corporations (‘Corp_Share’) is also negatively correlated with 
earnings predictability measure (‘EP’).  In sharp contrast, ownership by foreign institutions 
(‘For_Share’) is significantly and positively correlated with earnings predictability measure 
which indicates that higher level of foreign institutional ownership is associated with lower level 
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of earnings quality in Japanese firms. In addition, correlation between ownership by directors 
(‘Insider_Share’) and earnings predictabity is positively significant.  
With respect to remaining variables, earnings predictability measure is negatively correlated with 
firm size. The results indicate that, in general, larger firms report earnings which have better 
predictability than the earnings with smaller firms. In addition, earnings predictability measure is 
also negatively correlated with firm leverage (‘Lev’). The results support the monitoring role of 
debt financing by the debt providers that ensure greater earnings predictability. The results also 
show positive correlations of earnings predictability with profitability (‘Profitability’), sales 
growth (‘Growth’) and incidence of negative earnings (denoted by ‘Loss_Dummy’) which 
indicate that more profitable, growing and/or firms with negative earnings disclose earnings 
number which has less predictability. None of the correlation coefficients is large enough to 
consider the multicollinearity problem in this study. 
 As an alternative way to confirm multicollinearity issue, this study also checks VIF values of the 
variables considered in this study. The highest VIF value is 2.36 (tolerance value is 0.424) for 
the variable ‘Size’. According to Hair et al. (1998), VIF values less than 10 (tolerance value 
greater than 0.10) do not indicate any serious multicollinearity problem. 
 
The above relationships, however, are seen on a univariate basis, and thus they do not control for 
possible confounding factors. In order to investigate relations in a more robust manner by 
controlling for alternative explanations, in next section, this study reports results of multivariate 
regression specifications. 




4.3 Regression Analysis and Findings 
According to the earnings predictability proxy used in this study, higher (lower) the value of 
predictability measure indicates lower (higher) earnings predictability. As a result, negative 
(positive) coefficients of independent variables indicate favorable (unfavorable) impact on 
earnings predictability, and thus earnings quality. The results of regression analysis are reported 
in table 4.  
The study finds that the coefficient of ‘Fin_Share’ is negative and significant at the 1% level 
(−0.014, t=−2.91). It means greater (smaller) the ownership by financial institutions, lower 
(higher) the value of earnings predictability measure. The result suggests that reported earnings 
of firms with higher (lower) level of stock ownership by domestic financial institutions 
demonstrate better (poorer) earnings predictability, and thus better (poorer) earnings quality. The 
finding is consistent with ‘efficient monitoring hypothesis’ which claim that financial institutions 
as investors have the necessary skill, ability and incentives to monitor the reporting behaviors of 
listed firms.  However, the study estimates negative but insignificant coefficient (-0.005, t=-1.60) 
for ‘Corp_Share’. Thus, it fails to conclude any significant role of ownership by domestic 
business corporations on earnings predictability. On the other hand, the coefficient of 
‘For_Share’ is positive and significant at the 1 percent level (0.028, t=4.70). This indicates that 
firms with higher (lower) level of stock ownership by foreign institutions have lower (higher) 
earnings predictability, and thus lower (higher) earnings quality. The finding is consistent with 
‘transient investment hypothesis’ and/or ‘information asymmetry hypothesis’. This study also 
fails to find significant coefficient (0.013, t=1.38) of ‘Insider_Share’,  
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As for the control variables, table 4 reports several significant relations. There is a positive and 
significant coefficient for firm profitability, indicating that earnings predictability is less in 
highly profitable firms. In addition, there is a positive and significant coefficient for 
‘Loss_Dummy’, suggesting that firms with negative income have lower earnings predictability. 
Furthermore, this study reports a negative and significant coefficient for ‘Size’, which is 
consistent with argument that larger firms report earnings that have better predictability of future 
earnings than smaller firms. However, this study does not find any significant coefficients for 
firms’ leverage (‘Lev’) and growth potentials (‘Growth’). 
                                 [INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
5.0 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This study empirically examines the relationship between ownership structure and earnings 
predictability in Japanese listed companies. In particular, this study investigates how three 
important categories of ownership (i.e. domestic institutional, foreign, and insider ownership) 
associated with earnings predictability in Japanese listed firms. The results show that higher 
domestic institutional (financial) ownership is associated with greater earnings predictability. 
The findings support the argument that institutional shareholders especially financial institutions 
ensure effective monitoring over corporate reporting practices which lead to better earnings 
quality.  In sharp contrast, this study finds that incremental foreign institutional ownership in 
Japanese listed firms is associated with lower earnings predictability. Such finding is contrary to 
the oversimplifying assumption that increasing cross-border shareholdings always associated 
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with better earnings quality.  However, this study fails to find any significant impact of domestic 
corporate ownership and insider ownership on earnings predictability. 
The findings of this study are expected to be helpful for the Japanese regulators/policy makers to 
understand the roles played by different groups of investor on corporate reporting behavior and 
guide them to formulate or revise policies regarding corporate ownership structure. After the 
financial crisis in the 1990s, Japanese government adopted various  regulatory measures, 
including Banks’ Shareholdings Restriction Act 2001, which forced the financial institutions to 
reduce their shareholdings in the listed firms. Indeed, the average proportion of market stock 
held by financial institutional investors has declined from 45.2 percent in 1990 to 23.8 percent in 
2012 (TSE, 2012). At the same time, foreign ownership in the domestic listed firms was 
encouraged  which led the average proportion of market stock held by foreign investors to 
increase from 4.2 percent in 1990 to 24.3 percent in 2012 (TSE, 2012). Thus, the evidence 
derived from this study is expected to assist Japanese regulators to evaluate and reconsider their 
adopted policies regarding the ownership structure in the listed companies.  
For investors and creditors, the findings would help them to assess the predictability of reported 
earnings number based on the ownership structure of the listed firms. Wang (2006) mentions that 
understanding about how an earnings quality varies with ownership structure provides potential 
benefits to investors. 
This study also has a research implication as no other study explore the relationship between 
earnings predictability and ownership structure in the Japanese context. 
The limitation of this study is that though attempt has been to control for other factors that affect 
the earnings predictability of a firm, there could be omitted correlated variables that may affect 
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the association between ownership structure and earnings predictability. Moreover, the 
endogeneity issue associated with corporate ownership structure is not addressed in this study.  
Dealing with these limitations could be an avenue for future research. In addition, decomposing 
earnings into components (i.e., cash flows from operation and total accruals) and investigating 
the predictability issue would also be an interesting issue for future research.  Further research 
should also try to address other constructs of earnings quality to revisiting the similar phenomena 
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Table 1: Industry-wise sample classifications over the sample period 
2007-2012 
Industry name Observations Percent Cum. 
Chemicals 732 10.10 10.10 
Construction 528 7.28 17.38 
Electric Appliances 744 10.26 27.65 
Electric Power & Gas 102 1.41 29.06 
Foods 330 4.55 33.61 
Glass & Ceramics Products 156 2.15 35.76 
Information & Communication 282 3.89 39.65 
Iron & Steel 204 2.81 42.47 
Land Transportation 270 3.73 46.19 
Machinery 702 9.69 55.88 
Marine Transportation 72 0.99 56.87 
Metal Products 216 2.98 59.85 
Nonferrous Metals 126 1.74 61.59 
Other Products 198 2.73 64.32 
Pharmaceutical 138 1.90 66.23 
Precision Instruments 132 1.82 68.05 
Pulp & Paper 66 0.91 68.96 
Real Estate 114 1.57 70.53 
Retail Trade 270 3.73 74.25 
Rubber Products 66 0.91 75.17 
Services 294 4.06 79.22 
Textile & Apparels 210 2.90 82.12 
Transport Equipment 426 5.88 88.00 
Warehousing and Harbor transportation 162 2.24 90.23 
Wholesale Trade 708 9.77 100.00 
Total 7,248 100.00   









Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Variable           Observation               Mean             Std. Dev. 
EP 7248 0.024 0.019 
Fin_Share 7248 0.255 0.126 
Corp_Share 7248 0.270 0.174 
For_Share 7248 0.109 0.108 
Insider_Share 7248 0.033 0.067 
Size 7248 11.322 1.394 
Leverage 7248 0.522 0.195 
Profitabilty 7248 0.048 0.050 
Growth 7248 0.011 0.161 
Loss_Dummy 7248 0.093 0.290 
Source: Author’s research. 
Note:(1)Variable descriptions 
EP= earnings predictability measure following Lipe (1990) using seven years rolling 
window, 
Fin_Share= fraction of total shares owned by domestic financial institutions, 
Corp_Share= fraction of total shares owned by domestic business corporations, 
For_Share= fraction of total shares owned by foreign institutional investors, 
Insider_Share= fraction of total shares owned by directors, 
Size = natural logarithm of total assets, 
Profitability = income  before extra-ordinary items divided by total assets at the 
beginning of the year, 
Lev= total liabilities divided by total assets at the beginning of the year, 
Growth= sales growth rate,  














Table 3: Correlation matrix 
Variable EP Fin_Share Corp_Share For_Share Insider_Share        Size Leverage Profitability Growth Loss_Dummy 
EP 1 
Fin_Share -0.1032** 1 
Corp_Share -0.0400** -0.5460** 1 
For_Share 0.1032** 0.3838** -0.3801** 1 
Insider_Share 0.0882** -0.2938** -0.1738** -0.1080** 1 
Size -0.1451** 0.5388** -0.2300** 0.5991** -0.2712** 1 
Leverage -0.1770** 0.0330** 0.0502** -0.2462** -0.0963** 0.1458** 1 
Profitability 0.1048** 0.0640** -0.0395** 0.3276** -0.0963** 0.0712** -0.3159** 1 
Growth 0.0206 0.0136 0.0115 0.0686** 0.0319** 0.0429** 0.007 0.3692** 1 
Loss_Dummy 0.2046** -0.0938** -0.022 -0.1094** -0.0112 -0.1215** 0.0938** -0.4934** -0.2700** 1 
Source: Author’s research. 
Note: (1) ** and * indicate statistically significant at 1%and 5%, respectively. 
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Table 4: Regression results of earnings quality (EP)  on ownership structure (2007-
2012) 
Variable Model              
  coef. t-stat 
Dependent variable: EP   
  
Fin_Share -0.014*** -2.91 
Corp_Share -0.005 -1.60 
For_Share 0.028*** 4.70 
Insider_Share 0.013 1.38 
Size -0.003*** -5.10 
Lev -0.004 -1.40 
Profitability 0.061*** 4.50 
Growth 0.003 1.51 
Loss_Dummy 0.015*** 11.58 
Constant 0.044*** 8.33 
Industry dummy Included 
Year dummy Included 
N 7248             
adj. R-sq 0.317 
F-statistics 29.00   
Source: Author’s research. 
Note: (1) t-statistics are based on heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation corrected standard 
errors; (2) ***, **, and * indicate statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
